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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NATHAN SEAMONS as the surviving partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND.
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
-vsLARRY D. ANDERSON and
HANS P. ANDERSON.
Defendants and Appellants.
and RICHARD PETERSON.
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners. doing
business in the firm name and style
of VALLEY CAR MARKET.
Defendants and CrossAppellants.

BRlEF OF
RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT
RICHARD PETERSON
Case No. 7691

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appeal of the Andersons is confined to the
record without the transcript of the evidence. For our
purpose, however, it is necessary to state the facts not
only from the record relied on by the appellants but
upon the evidence transcribed by the reporter.
In regard to the appellants Andersons observations
of fact contained in their ·brief as to the Court allowing
J>eterson, as cross-complainant, to amend his pleading
so as to ask for pecuniary relief against said Andersons,
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it will be

ob~erved

that while through an inadvertaney

we failed to ask for such relief in our amended crosscomplaint, we did do so in our first (pp. 10). The An~
dersons were given leave to amend their pleading (tr.
347), but failed to avail themselves of the opportunity.
The transcript of the evidence shows by Andersons'
own testimony that they still owed $117.00 on the $267.00
postdated check (tr. 199 exhibit A2), and the findings
of the Court show that they knew of the agreement between the Valley Car Market and Peterson (pp. 113
paragraph 18 <?f the findings), and which. they do not
attack.
As to the issue not being formed by the pleadings
as urged by counsel for the Andersons, we believe it
is sufficient to point out that sub-paragraph b of Rule
15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on page 24 thereof
reads : ' 'When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall ·be treated in all respects as if they have been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion by any party at any time, even after judgment,
but failure to so amend does not affect· the result of
the trial of these issues."SEE

ALSO

RULE 54

Counsel for the Andersons points out also that nothing was said in the Peterson brief in the Court below
as to the Andersons being indebted to Peterson. Counsel
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fails to observe that we said at the end of that brief that
n1ore points could be raised or discussed but we could
carry the same in argtunent before the Court, which we
did.
\Y.ith these added observations as to the

Anderson~

statement of fact, so far as they are not here modified,
they are substantially correct.
Plaintiff Seamons a s a p p e 11 a n t relates, finally
filed a second amended complaint (pp. 40) whereby
a1nong other things he sought, so far as this counterclainlant is concerned, to have him set forth his claim
as to the Mercury car which Peterson had placed in the
hands of the Market for purposes of sale.
The facts as we further see them are that the Market was to sell the Mercury for Peterson, with the stipulation and understanding that the Market was to have
all over the sum of $1950.00 that they received from the
car (tr. 45, 247, 248, 249, 250), and only when Peterson
had received in his own hands the said $1950.00 was
title to pass to the buyer, and only when he received said
money was he to acknowledge his signature before a
Notary Public on the certificate of title ( tr. 250).
Notwithstanding this agreement, Peterson received only $1300.00 through Mr. Neilsen of the $1400.00
that Neilsen recieved from Seamons, and later received
$100.00 more when the Market, through Neilsen, got a
$150.00 check from Larry Anderson to take up the postSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dated check of $267.00. This is admitted in the Market's
brief. Thus Peterson received a total of $1400.00 leavIng a balance of $550.00 due him.
It will be observed from this statement that we disagree with the statement of counsel for Nielsen and Bitters as to who was taking the chance. on the Packard
car and as to what it might bring on resale; and we
further point out the fact that the pleading of the Mar~
ket ( pp. 53) does not deny the allegations contained
in paragraph 2 of Peterson's cross-complaint that
Peterson was to have $1950.00 before the Market was to
have anything at all (pp. 50); and it may be further
pointed out that the jury further found in the advisory
verdict to question No. 3 submitted to them that Peterson stated to Nielsen when he handed the title to hiln
that said Nielsen was not to deliver the same until he,
Peterson, had actually received $1950.00 in money (pp.
76).
That plaintiff and cross-appellant Seamons knew
of the arrangement whereby title was not to pass until
Peterson had received the full amount of $1950.00 was
found by the jury in answering question No. 8 (pp.
77). Notwithstanding this knowledge, Seamons placed
his notary stamp and signature upon the certificate of
title without any authorization from Peterson (tr. 134,
Peterson exhibit .2), in an attempt to take title out of
Peterson without the conditions imposed having been met.
Seamons did this some weeks after making a purported
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loan to Andersons, the appellants, who purported to
give the l\lercury as security (tr. 10), and as mentioned
before, cross appellant Nielsen put one hundred dollars
of this in his own pocket and gave Peterson $1300.00
(tr. 249, 250).

This is perhaps an abbreviated state-

ment facts, but in the discusion in support of our points
and in defense to claims by the other parties to the
action, we will enlarge thereon.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. That the Court erred in making and entering
paragraph 1 of its judgment, dated April 9th, 1951, limiting defendant and cross appellant, Richard Peterson, recovery against cross-appellees Ray Bitters and Clayton
Nielsen, severally and jointly to the sum of $300.00 and
failing to award the sum of $550.00 to this cross- appellant, Richard Peterson, against said parties severally
and jointly.
2. In making and entering paragraph 2 of its judgment limiting Richard Peterson, cross-appellant, to the
sum of $117.00 against Larry D. Anderson and Hans P.
Anderson severally and jointly and failing to award the
sum of $550.00 to this cross-appellant, Richard Peterson,
against said parties severally and jointly.
3. In making and entering paragraph three of its
judgment limiting cross-appellant, Richard Peterson,
to the sum of $25.00 against plaintiff, Nathan Seamons,
and failing to award judgment in the sum of $550.00
against said Seamons severally and jointly with Ray
Bitters and Clayton E. Nielsen in favor of said Richard
Peterson.
4. In making and entering paragraph 4 of said
judgment awarding title to the Mercury and Packard
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cars and the proceeds on the sales therefrom to Nathan
Searnons without giving this cross-appellant a lien on
said earH to the arnount of $550.00.
5. ·sy making and entering conclusions number 1,
2and 3 limiting the same to $300.00, $117.00 and $25.00
respectively as to the amounts recoverable by crossappellant~ Richard Peterson, as against Clayton E. Nielsen, Ray Bitters, Hans P. Anderson and Larry D. Anderson and Nathan Seamons respectively, and failing
to conclude that said Richard P'eterson was entitled
to a judgment against said parties jointly and severally
in the sum of $550.00 and .entitling said Richard Peterson to a lien on the above mentioned Mercury and Packard cars up to that sun1.
6. By making and entering conclusion number 6
concluding that $300.00, $117.00 and $25.00 is equivalent
to the sum of $550.00 and only these sums should be
awarded to said Richard Peterson, and failing to award
said Richard Peterson the sum heretofore stated.
7. The Court erred in submitting question number 2 to the jury in that the defendants Ray Bitters
and Clayton Nielsen in their answer to cross-appellent's
Amended Cross-Complaint admitted the sum of $1950.00
was the sum to be paid said Richard Peterson before
they were entitled to any money on said agreement
heretofore found in findings of fact by the Court and
as alleged in said Peterson's Amended Answer and
Cross-Complaint.
8. The Court erred in failing to find in its Finding
of Fact that plaintiff, Nathan Seamons, and defendants,
Ray Bitters and Clayton Nielsen, were jointly and severally indebted to said Richard Peterson in the sum
of $550.00 or in lieu thereof, the owner of said Mercury
and Packard cars or $550.00 of the proceeds from the
sale thereof.
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.A.RGUMENT

Point8 1 to 8
~-\.11 th~8e point8, "·~ believe, can be discussed to-

gether as they all go to the n1atter of the Court limit- /
ing cross-appellant, Richard Peterson, recovery against
all other parties to this action severally and Jointly
short of $550.00, the su1n 've claim is due and owing
J>eterson.
Referring this Court to our Statement of Facts
as our starting point in this argument in support of what
\\~e believe the cause shows by the evidence, we continue thus: That there was some talk between Richard
Peterson and the Market about Peterson taking the Andersons' Packard for $425.00 ( tr. 248), Peterson testifying that the l\larket was to take the chance of resale
since he wanted $1950.00 and no Packard (tr. 248), and
no authority was sought or given Market to repair
the Packard by Market's own admission (tr. 299). The
trade was made by the Market, allowing Andersons .
$425.00 on the Packard and Larry Anderson giving a
postdated check of $267.00. (This check is spoken of
as the $270.00 in the evidence (exhibit No. 4, Tr. 249.))
Shortly thereafter, the Market traded the Packard to
Mr. Darley of Wellsville, obtaining an old Chrysler
valued at $150.00 by Nielsen, and $300.00 in cash ( tr. 26,
cross-appellant's exhibit 3). (We take the testimony
as controlling over exhibit 3 as to cash received).
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We believe that question No. 2 (pp. 76) was erroneously subn1itted to the jury in view of Market's pleadings ( pp. 53), as they do not deny the agreement set up
in paragrapr1 2 of Cross-Appellant's Cross-Complaint
(pp. ~0) as to cross-appellant Peterson's allegation that
the Market was to have all over $1950.00, and Market
is therefore concluded by said answer, for it certainly
does not confor1n to sub-paragraph b of Rule 8, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. But assuming for the purpose of argument only, that the question was properly
submitted to the jury and further assuming that the
~f arket had the right to sell the Packard, nowhere is
there any evidence to support their action in trading for
the old Chrysler car or any car as part down payment
on the Packard. A right to sell is not a right to trade.
So if we take the question as having been properly submitted and answered by the jury it still does not aid the
Market for they took the Packard and without authority fro1n Peterson proceeded to make a trade with Darley for a worthless old car in order that they might enrich themselves $300.00 and which was a conversion if
the Packard belonged to Peterson. But we maintain
that the jury could not find any other answer nor could
the court to said question No. 2 than that of "yes"
because of said sub-paragraph b of said rule 8.
The Packard admittedly was worth $450.00 as it
1s shown by exhibit No. 3. Under this state of facts,
Peterson was certainly entitled to $425.00 ~ and we beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lieYe it cannot be properl~· disputed that Peterson was
entitled to receive at

lea.~t

$425.00, the price at which

the Packard \Yas taken in ( tr. 26 ~ exhibit 3) ; and so
n1uch n1ore as evidenced by the posdated check of Larry
Anderson to n1ake the $1950.00. All above that sum
belonged to ~Iarket, but l\Iarket proceeded to take their
conunissions before Peterson had been fully paid as is
sho,vn in their brief, and their own testimony given
in Court (tr. 58). It is admitted in the Market's
brief that the l\[arket took $100.00 out of finance money
and $50.00 out of the $150.00 check given to Nielsen by
Larry . .,t\.nderson
.
in order to cancel the said $267.00 check.
That the ~1arket was not entitled to any commission for
sale of the Mercury before payment to Peterson of
$1950.00 is clear even under their own statement of the
case, yet they took it.
That the Market proceeded to finance the Packard
with Seamons in order to sell and trade with Darley
without first obtaining authority from Peterson is another fact (we assume here that the Packard was Peterson's for purpose of argument only) and which is certainly controlling evidence to show that the Market
considered that they could sell or trade the Packard
or do anything else that they desired. In connection
with this, it may be further observed that Peterson
never saw the Packard before the deal ( tr. 42.) This
comes from Nielsen himself. Nielsen further testified
that the deal was for $1950.00 (tr. 42, 43), as also did
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J>eterson (tr. 264), who further testified that he was
dealing with the Market only and didn't even know who
bought the Mercury until after the deal (tr. 264). And
further that he knew nothing of the postdated check
until May 23, 1949 (tr. 267). However it was May 6th,
l!lJ!) that Nielsen was paid the $150.00 check by Larry
Anderson with the understanding that the $270.00 check
was to be destroyed. Nielsen instead or destroying the
check held it until about August 15th, 1949 ( tr. 268),
when he gave it to Peterson, though he kne"\\T it was
worthless, and had not even taken the trouble to endorse
it.
Another significant fact is that when Larry Anderson decided not to go through with the Mercury matter, he made a bill of sale to ~Iarket dated May 26, 1949
(Anderson exhibit "A"), which was the same date that
Nielsen through false representation got the certificate
of title from Peterson ( tr. 250), and the date when the
l\J ercury deal was called off according to Nielsen himself ( tr. 35).
We believe all this goes to show, assuming that
question No. 2 was properly put to the jury, that the
finding of the jury is not supported by any substantial,
believeable evidence, and the finding of the jury and
Court should have been ''Yes'' as to Peterson receiving
$1950.00 regardles~ of what the Packard sold for. But
regardless of that, the Packard did sell for more than
$425.00 as heretofore pointed out, and the Market was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accountable to Peterson for $1950.00.
The plaintiff and Cross-.. \ppellant,
.
Sean1ons, never
relied on any indicia of title that Anderson had to the
~fercury

.

is conclusivelv
. established (tr. 197). He had
never seen the title and only became interested in it when
the finance co1npany \\canted it and Seamons got it
through Nielsen, Nielsen telling Peterson that the Andersons wanted the title in order to get plates for the
~Iercury (tr. 250), and at which time the Andersons had
already notified Nielsen that they did not want the car
(tr. 35). This culminated in a bill of sale from Anderson to :Jlarket, dated 1Iay 23rd, 1949, the same date, as
will be observed, that Nielsen received title from Peterson (tr. 250).
That Sean1ons knew of the agreement with the
\'alley Car Market is we believe substantiated by the
evidence, and there seems to be no doubt that there
were close ties existing between the Market and appellant
Seamons (tr. 250; 251; 252;), which shows they were
working together as against Peterson. The finding
of the jury is fully supported by the evidence in answering No. 8 of the questions submitted which read,
''Did Seamons and Loveland know of the terms of the
original verbal agreement between Richard Petersen
and the Valley Car Market covering the Mercury car
within a day or so of the transaction~'' Answer ''yes''
or "no". Answer, Yes (pp. 77). It may be added that
~Jarket was selling cars for Seamons (tr. 257).
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Going to the question as to when title to the Mereury car was to pass, the Court submitted the following
questjon No. 3: ''Did Richard Peterson ever state to
1

Clayton Nielsen and or Ray Bitters, in substance as
.

'

hP Higned the certificate of ownership on the Mercury
and handed saine to Nielsen, that said certificate was
not to be delivered until said Richard Peterson had
receivde $1950.00 in money~" Answer "Yes" or "No".
Answer : Yes ( tr. 76). We believe this is very fully
supported by the evidence (tr. 250), and when the !{arket took the certificate they were duty bound to pay
Peterson the $1950.00 upon its delivery to any other
person, which they admittedly did by delivering said
certificate to Seamons ; and this is so regardless of any
agreement that they had before. This would seem to
follow as a matter of law. That the conditional delivery of the certificate of title came after April 24th
cannot be doubted ( tr. 250, 295).

As to any contention that appellant Seamons might
Inake as having a claim against Peterson, we must keep
in 1nind that Sean1ons knew of the deal between Peterson and Market and that Larry Anderson himself declared that he was not to have title until the Mercury
had been paid for ( tr. 196), nor did he think the deal
was completed (tr. 207, 208). Then too, Seamons did not
even have the certificate of title to the Mercury car until
weeks after the money was loaned to the Andersons'
the money to be paid to Peterson (tr. 250), for he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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could not have had it before May 23rd, 1949, thP rlay·
Nielsen received it fron1 Peterson. The evidence further sho"ys that Seamons put his o'Yn notary statnp on
the certificate of title "ithout authorization ( tr. 253),
and that he retained the certificate until Peterson discovered the unauthorized notary (tr. 253) and regained
the same.
Thereafter, in order to avoid trouble, and compromise the matter (tr. 251), Peterson offered to give Seanlons what Seamons actually had in the Mercury. Seamons refused this offer and demanded all finance
charges, insurance and other charges. This of course
Peterson refused, preferring to stand on his legal rights
(tr. 252).
The errors here complained of as coming from the
Court in its findings, conclusions and judgment are
therefore well bottomed.
We respectively say that the Court below erred
in not granting Peterson, a joint and several judgment
against all the other parties, as the Court found. that
they all knew that no title was to pass from Peterson
until he actually received $1950.00. And if this is true,
that is, that all the parties knew of such an agreement
between the Valley Car Markt and Peterson then neither
or any of them can have any claim against him as they
will evidently try to maintain. To this effect is 57 -3a71 and 57 -3a-72 of our Annotated Statutes, 1943, and
under which the case of Swartz vs. White, 80 Utah pp
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150-157, 13 Pac., (2) 643 evidently decided and which
rPads in part as follows : ''Where the alleged owner
of a car· rnerely has possession of the certificate of
ownership indorsed in blank by the true owner, with no
nante filled in, indicating the new owner, and he, in the
presence of one advancing money to him on the car, and
at request of lender signs his name in blank he acquires
no title and he is merely borrowing". We believe our
case is much stronger in favor of Peterson than was
this cause in favor of the true o'vner, for here not only
did Seamons and Andersons and of course the Valley
Car Market have actual knowledge of the terms between Market and Peterson but no name of new buyer
was ever placed in certificate of title and Peterson's
signature was not even acknowledged before a notary
before it came into the hands of Seamons some three
weeks after the money had been advanced, as has heretofore been pointed out. And that Seamons himself
placed his o'vn Notary upon said certificate after he
received this as has also been pointed out. Mr. Seamons
was therefore not a innocent purchaser without notice
of ~uch facts to put him on notice for he knew, among other things, when he advanced the money that the
\ 7 alley Car Market did not claim to be the owner of said
Mercury and that they had limited authority.
We having received but $1400.00 on the Mercury
there is yet due under the agreement with the Valley
Car Market the further sum of $550.00. This would
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work no hardship upon Sea.n1ons a~ under the testiinony
of Bitter~~ one of the partner~ in the ~f nrket, he, Bitter~
and Nielsen "·ould have to u1ake up any loss that SeaJnon~ n1ight sustain in the transaction ( tr. 99).

.A.s to

Bitters and Nielsen they can suffer very little for this
is "·hat they have taken of the money received.

$100.00 Finance money.
$50.00 on Anderson check of $150.00 given for cancellation postdated check in the sum of $267.00
$300.00 on Packard sale to Darley, Chrysler being
valued at $150.00 by Nielsen as heretofore pointed out.

ll

$150.00 placed on Chrysler by Nielsen's own testiJnony, as also heretofore pointed out.
·
$600.00
To so1newhat reiterate our contention in this matter
amounts to this: That Peterson, the owner of the Mercury car took it to the Valley Market for said Market to
sell, the Market to retain all over $1950.00 for and as
their commission for selling same. (This is evidenced
by Peterson retaining the title to said Mercury and other
matters appearing of record and which has been pointed
out in this brief). That the buyer, whoever he might
be was not to be considered the owner of. said car until
Peterson had actually received the $1950.00. That Seamons and the Andersons knew of this agreement as
has been pointed out. And that there is yet due and
owing to said Peterson the sum of $550.00 from all of
:-~aid parties severaly and jointly before either or all of

f.
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thexn can assert any claim to said Mercury now converted into money, it having been sold by agreement of
the parties in open court.
Conclusion

In conclusion we submit that a reading of the testimony, a review of the pleadings, the issues as pleaded
or as formed in court by testimony will convince this
Court that the Court below erred in not making findings, conclusions and judgment against all the other
parties and in favor of Mr. Peterson for the sum of
$550.00. That this judgment should have been joint
and several. If we are correct in this then we say that
this Court should direct the Court below to make such
findings, and conclusions so as to properly bottom a
judgment in the sum of $550.00 in favor of said Richard
Peterson.
Respectfully submitted,

HARVEY A. SJOSTROM
Attorney for Defendant and
Cross-Appellant Richard
Peterson.
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